Cardano Proposal Wey Go Redirect Unallocated Staking Rewards

Cardano DRep Ryan Wiley, wey people sabi as Cerkoryn, don submit one proposal to redistribute part of di staking reward capacity wey still remain unallocated under di network current rules.

Di Dynamic Rewards proposal bin dey before inside CIP-0163 together with one mechanism for time-bound delegation. Wiley don now open separate requests for di rewards proposal and di changes wey match am for CIP-0163, so dat di two ideas fit dey consider independently.

How Dynamic Rewards Go Change Cardano Staking

Cardano holders fit delegate ADA to stake pools wey dey participate for block production. Dem dey calculate rewards every epoch, and na di pool stake, pledge and performance dey contribute to di calculation.

Pool pledge na di amount of ADA wey di operator commit give di pool. Di rewards system still get saturation cap, wey dey limit di reward weight wey pool fit gain as im stake dey increase.

According to di Dynamic Rewards proposal, reward capacity fit still remain unallocated when stake no dey active, when pool pass im reward saturation cap or when operator no meet im declared pledge. Under di proposed model, dem go redistribute dat capacity among eligible pools using capped reward weights.

Di saturation limit go still constrain each pool relative weight. Any pool wey fail im pledge check no go receive reward, and pool production performance go still remain part of di calculation.

Di proposal still discuss how changes to saturation parameters fit affect distribution. Cardano k parameter dey determine di target number of pools wey dem use for di saturation calculation. Another separate proposal, CIP-0050, dey consider extra limit based on di relationship between pool stake and im pledge. CIP-0050 still remain proposal.

Di Trade-Off Between Rewards and Reserves

Cardano reward system dey draw from transaction fees and monetary expansion from di network reserves. After dem don account for Treasury share, di remaining funds go enter di rewards calculation. Amounts wey remain unallocated under current rules dey return back to di reserves.

To redirect more reward capacity go give pools go affect how much go return to reserves. If other conditions remain unchanged, bigger distribution go lead to faster net reserve depletion pass calculation wey return more funds.

Wiley work still discuss di possibility to separately lower rho, di parameter wey determine di rate wey funds dey draw from reserves. Reduction fit offset part of di additional reserve use, and e go still affect di funds wey dey available for rewards and di Treasury. Dem present am as separate policy choice, no be automatic consequence of Dynamic Rewards.

Di earlier CIP-0163 document still revisit one concern wey dem consider for Cardano Shelley-era design: whether large pools fit get incentive to censor transactions wey dey delegate stake go elsewhere.

Wiley argue say sustained censorship go require coordination among block producers and any reward benefit wey fit show go share with other participants. Im assessment dey form part of di proposal rationale to revisit di existing design.

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Separate Decision From Delegation Expiry

CIP-0163 originally combine di rewards change with proposal for time-bound delegation. Wiley new requests wan separate di proposed reward calculation from di question whether delegation activity suppose dey reaffirm after some time.

For di GitHub discussion, Wiley explain say di reason for di split relate to governance and no be technical dependency. Feedback on di combined CIP focus heavy on delegation expiry, while separate proposals go allow each change to dey discuss on im own.

Wiley indicate say di two ideas fit complement each other, but one fit dey accepted without di other. CIP editors dey review di related requests with attention to whether di split preserve di relevant work.

Di Dynamic Rewards request still open and dem never assign am CIP number. Cardano existing staking reward rules still dey in effect during di review.