Ryan Wiley Expects Limited Immediate Impact From Cardano’s 75 ADA Pool Fee Proposal

Ryan Wiley, who authored the proposal to reduce Cardano’s minPoolCost from 170 to 75 ADA, said during a September 23 Governance Hour discussion that he does not expect a large immediate shift in delegated stake. The change would let smaller pools offer a lower fixed fee, but operators would choose whether to do so, and many delegators rarely change pools. Voting on the proposal closes October 11.

Fixed Fees Weigh More Heavily on Small Cardano Pools

Despite its name, minPoolCost does not measure a pool’s operating expenses. It sets the lowest fixed fee an operator may declare. That fee is deducted from the pool’s total reward for an epoch before the remaining amount is distributed according to its margin and participants’ stake. It is charged once per rewarded epoch, not once per block.

Wiley illustrated the effect using a pool that earns approximately ₳300 in an epoch. At a fixed fee of ₳170, about ₳130 remains before the percentage margin and distribution. If the operator instead sets the fee at ₳75, approximately ₳225 remains. The operator would receive ₳95 less in fixed fees, while more of the reward would be available for distribution.

A pool producing more blocks spreads the same fixed fee across a larger total reward. For a pool producing only one block in an epoch, the fee consumes a much greater share. The proposal argues that this makes smaller pools less attractive to delegators and creates a barrier to gaining the stake needed to grow.

A Lower Minimum Does Not Guarantee New Delegation

Wiley expects some small operators to lower their fees if the proposal passes. He does not expect the change alone to move substantial stake quickly, because many delegators stay with their existing pools even when other options become available.

The previous reduction, from ₳340 to ₳170 in 2023, did not cause pool fees across Cardano to converge on the new minimum, according to the research cited in Wiley’s proposal. That history offers context, though it does not establish how operators would respond to another cut.

The proposed change also carries a cost for operators who use the lower fee. DRep and stake pool operator Martin Lang opposes reducing minPoolCost before introducing a sustainable minimum percentage margin. His concern is that competitive pressure could push small operators to accept less revenue without reducing their infrastructure costs. A higher delegator return alone would not increase a pool’s block production or guarantee its long-term viability.

Cardano’s Other Staking Changes Require Separate Decisions

Wiley described the fee reduction as one part of a broader discussion about Cardano’s staking incentives. A separate, nonbinding stake pool operator vote is examining whether the k parameter should rise from 500 to 1000. That parameter affects the stake level at which a pool becomes saturated. The vote cannot change k on its own.

Another proposal, CIP-23, would introduce minPoolMargin, a lower bound on an operator’s percentage fee. It remains proposed and specifies an initial value of zero. CIP-23 does not itself remove minPoolCost; setting effective values for the two parameters would require separate governance decisions.

The October vote has a narrower effect. If approved, it would lower the fixed fee that Cardano permits a pool to declare. Each operator would still decide what to charge, while any change to pool saturation or the wider reward structure would follow its own governance process.