Cardano Parameter Update Fails After SPO Support Falls Short
A Cardano governance action combining a lower minimum stake pool cost with higher Plutus memory limits expired after failing to secure the required support from stake pool operators. The outcome was followed by CAP #10, a constitutional proposal examining whether SPO approval should be required for changes to stake pool economic parameters
By SongMarketCap
The action, titled “Reduce minPoolCost to 75 ADA and increase Plutus Memory Limits (Part 2),” expired on September 1. DRep support reached 68.57%, above the required 67% threshold, while SPO support finished at 34.5%, below the required 51%.
Cardano Parameter Update Misses SPO Threshold
The governance action combined two separate protocol parameter changes.
The first proposed reducing minPoolCost from 170 ADA to 75 ADA. The parameter defines the minimum fixed cost a stake pool can deduct from rewards before the remaining rewards are distributed to delegators.
The second proposed increasing Plutus execution memory limits. Maximum memory per transaction would rise from 16.5 million to 17.5 million units, while maximum memory per block would increase from 72 million to 77.5 million units.
Intersect described the action as combining two independent protocol parameter changes that had previously been recommended.
The Constitutional Committee recorded five votes in favor, with no votes against and two members not voting. The DRep threshold was also reached. SPO approval was the only required threshold the action failed to meet before expiration.
Plutus Memory Change Required SPO Approval
The proposed minPoolCost reduction would not, on its own, have required a stake pool operator vote under Cardano’s current governance framework.
minPoolCost belongs to the economic group of protocol parameters. The SPO requirement was triggered because the same governance action also included a change to maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory], which is classified among Cardano’s security relevant critical parameters.
When a governance action combines parameters with different approval requirements, the thresholds attached to those groups must all be satisfied. The Plutus block memory change therefore made SPO approval necessary for the entire action.
The result left the action above the DRep threshold but below the required SPO threshold.
Intersect had already reported limited SPO participation during the voting period. A late August update showed SPO support at 26.11% before the final figure increased to 34.5%.
No official analysis has attributed the result to a single cause. Some governance participants criticized the decision to combine unrelated parameter changes in one action, while public SPO commentary also raised broader questions around stake pool economics.
CAP #10 Expands the Stake Pool Governance Debate
Following the expired action, the Constitutional Amendment Portal listed CAP #10 under the title “Require SPO Approval for Changes to Stake Pool Economic Parameters.”
The proposal is currently marked In Consultation, placing it in an off-chain public discussion stage. It does not currently change Cardano ledger rules or existing governance thresholds.
Its title proposes requiring SPO approval for changes involving stake pool economic parameters. Under the current framework, economic parameters do not independently require an SPO vote unless they are included in an action that also contains parameters for which SPO approval is mandatory.
The full CAP #10 text, its authors, the exact parameters it would cover and any proposed voting threshold could not be confirmed from the publicly accessible primary document.
Public discussion following the expired action has also included proposals to submit future minPoolCost and Plutus parameter changes separately. That would allow each change to proceed under the governance thresholds assigned to its own parameter classification.
The failed action has therefore produced a concrete governance question beyond the original parameter changes: whether future decisions that alter stake pool economics should require direct SPO approval by constitutional design, rather than only when another critical parameter happens to bring SPOs into the vote.